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The Accumulated Earnings Tax and the
Problem of Diversification
Although recent unprecedented growth in the nation's economy
has resulted in increased profits for many corporations/ the rapidity
of technological change and the intensity of competition are making
it increasingly difficult for the executives of financially successful
corporations to rest on their achievements. Lines· of products and
even entire businesses may become outmoded over a short period
of time. The stability of a static industry may be shaken by- the
entry of a progressive new firm. In this context of uncertainty,
businessmen ·must continually seek means of ensuring continued
corporate success. One common means is to expand corporate operations into diverse markets. Diversification is not always easy, however.
New business opportunities are not always readily available, and
when a new opportunity does arise a corporation must be prepared
to move swiftly. Thus, liquid funds must be immediately obtainable.2 Corporations planning internal financing of diversification
encounter an additional problem. Where funds for diversification
are accumulated before specific plans are devised for their use, the
corporation-especially a relatively small, family enterprise3-risks
violating section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code. 4
The purpose of section 531, prevention of the use of the corporate form to.avoid shareholder taxation, is accomplished by forcing
corporations, under threat of a severe penalty tax, to distribute their
earnings and profits. Were it not for section 531, corporations could
accumulate funds in the corporate coffers so that shareholders could
avoid the income tax on dividends, but could later take the funds
out at capital gains rates. Shareholders could also use corporate
accumulations as a means of income deferral, or, in some cases, as
I. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsntAcr OF THE
UNITED STATES 498 (86th ed. 1965).
2. This may be a problem primarily of close corporations since acquisitions by other
corporations are frequently accomplished by means of an exchange of stock. This
method is usually unavailable for close corporations, however, because of the possibility
of dilution of control of the corporation.
3. As is often noted, as a practical matter the § 531 tax is applicable only to closely
held corporations since shareholder tax saving is not likely to be the motive for
retention where stock is widely held in relatively small lots. In 1954 it was proposed·
that corporations with more than 1500 shareholders, no one of which held more
than 10% of the stock, be specifically exempted from the operation of § 531. The
Senate Finance Committee rejected the proposal, however, since it might be difficult
for some "public" corporations to ~how that no shareholder owned more. than 10%
of the stock when constructive ownership was considered, and also because § 531 was
not usually applied to such corporations. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954).
4. "Section 531" is a term commonly used to describe generally the provisions of
the Code which deal with improper corporate accumulation of surplus, and the term
will be so used in this comment. In actuality, it is §§ 531-37 which work together to
determine the applicability of the accumulated earnings penalty tax.
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a way of awaiting a stepped-up basis of the stock upon death. Section
53 l combats these tax avoidance devices by imposing a penalty tax
on corporations "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding"
taxes on shareholders. 5 Although the purpose of tax avoidance is the
ultimate test of the applicability of section 531,6 the real controversy central to almost all section 531 cases is whether an accumulation of earnings and profits is for the reasonable needs of the business.
The reasonableness issue is crucial for two reasons. First, a finding
that an accumulation is unreasonable is, under section 533,7 determina:tive of the purpose to avoid tax, in the absence of• a showing
to the contrary by the taxpayer. Second, a taxpayer is given credit
under section 535(c) 8 against its accumulated taxable income for so
much of its accumulation as is shmm to be "for the reasonable needs
of the business."
While diversification is now considered a legitimate corporate
need authorizing the accumulation of earnings and profits,0 the
present standards of the Regulations under section 531, which, in
general, test the reasonableness of corporate accumulations by the
requirement of "specific, definite, and feasible plans" 10 for use of
5. The operative provision is § 532(a): "The accumulated earnings tax imposed by
section 531 shall apply to every corporation (other than those described in subsection
(b) [personal holding companies, foreign personal holding companies, and exempt
organizations]) formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax
with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by
permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed."
6. There is some conflict whether the purpose to avoid tax must be the "dominant
purpose" or merely one of the purposes. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits hold that
it must be one of the "determinating" purposes. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner,
253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); World Pub. Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir.
1948). The Second and Fifth Circuits state that it is unnecessary to decide whether
it is the dominant or primary purpose. Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d
424 (2d Cir. 1943); Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961). The
First Circuit holds that it must be the "dominant" purpose. Commissioner v. Young
Motor Co., 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1~63). In the Ninth Circuit, it is sufficient if
tax avoidance is "one" of the purposes. Cummins Diesel Sales, Inc. v. United States,
321 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1963).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 533(a) provides: "For purposes of section 532, the fact
that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the
income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance
of the evidence shall prove to the contrary."
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 535(c) provides in pertinent part: "(1) ••• [T]he
accumulated earnings credit is (A) an amount equal to such part of the earnings
and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the business, minus (B) the deduction allowed by subsection (b) (6) [which deduction is not
relevant !o the scope of this comme!}t] .••• (2) The credit allowable under paragraph
(1) shall m no case be less than the amount by which $100,000 exceeds the accumulated
earnings and profits of ~~ co~oration at the close of the preceding taxable year."
9. Altman, Recent Litigation Shows 5Jl Cases Can Be Won Despite Growing
P~essu_re b! the IRS, . ~O J. TAXATION 130 (~964). Altman suggests that acceptance of
diversification as a legitimate corporate need 1s one of the three major developments in
§ 581 in the past decade.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-l(b){l) (1959).
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the funds, seem too restrictive in terms of the problems of diversification as outlined above. In light of this criticism and of recent developments, the purposes of this comment are (1) to indicate the basic
principles of section 531, an understanding of which is vital to corporations anticipating retention of funds for the purpose of diversi:
fication; (2) to identify, with respect to the standards guiding the
imposition of the accumulated earnings tax, the problems which
Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts have for
some time skirted but must now consider forthrightly; and (3) to
outline a more realistic approach for testing the application of the
accumulated earnings penalty tax.

I.

THE REQUISITE CORPORATE UNDERSTANDING OF SECTION

531

Much of the difficulty that close corporations encounter in section 53 I cases comes from a conceptual confusion arising from the
peculiar nature of close corporations. Officers of close corporations
are usually the major shareholders, and the corporate form itself
is frequently a mere technicality. 11 For instance, a business operated
for many years as a proprietorship is often managed in exactly the
same manner after incorporation. As a result, there is frequently a
failure by the corporate officers to distinguish between the business
of the corporation and the business of the shareholders, and, in
addition, benveen legitimate corporate diversifying activities and
those investment activities which are proper only for individuals.12
Each of these distinctions is vital to a proper understanding of
section 53 I.
The necessity for the distinction between the business of the
corporation and the business of its shareholders arises because excessive accumulation is allowed under section 531 only for the reasonable needs of the business of the corporation itself.13 In the case
of an "incorporated proprietorship" (or partnership), when the
business is operated as a proprietorship its operations could be said
to be the business of the proprietor. The earnings of the business
are taxed to him, and he is free to use the remainder of the funds
as he pleases. Once the business is incorporated, however, the manu11. It has been suggested that treating close corporations as partnerships would
go a long way toward solving accumulated earnings problems. See Chommie, Surtax
A~idance and Extra Taxation of Corporate Earnings in the United States, United
Kingdom, and Canada, 12 TAX L. REv. 279 (1957). ·
12. See, e.g., Cummins Diesel Sales, Inc. v. United States, 321 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1963);
Bardahl Mfg. Corp., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. ,r 65200; Robert R. Walker,
Inc., ~-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. ,r 65028. It must be recognized, however,
that m some cases the corporate bounds of proper activity are so obviously overstepped as to indicate a deliberate violation of the statute rather than simply a confused concept of the corporation's business. See, e.g., Robert R. Walker, Inc., supra
(corporation built a house for its sole shareholder to entertain "business guests').
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-I(a) (1959).
.
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facture or sale of the goods or services is technically the business
of the corporation, while the business of the shareholder is merely
ownership of the corporation. Since the earnings of the corporation
are taxed only at preferential corporate rates, use of the funds is
limited to the business purposes of the corporation alone until the
funds are distributed as dividends to the shareholder and taxed to
him. It is this distinction that the officer-shareholders of some close
corporations fail to make.
A second consideration of which corporate officers must be aware
is the limitations on the type of business upon which a corporation
may properly embark to diversify and still avoid the imposition of
a penalty tax under section 531. In the past the scope of corporate
diversification was circumscribed and uncertain as a resuit of the
very limited view of the business of a corporation taken by the
Regulations, the Commissioner's litigation policy, and the courts
in section 531 cases. The Regulations under the 1939 Code provided
that radical changes in the business of a corporation on the basis
of an accumulation of earnings and profits might themselves show
a violation of the statute.14 Accordingly, the Commissioner attempted
to limit corporations to the particular lines of activity in which they
were then engaged. 15 Courts sought to determine the "regular" business of corporations and warned of "blind acceptance of marked
sweeps from previous rudder course" 16 and undertakings "which
seem to represent business anachronism." 17 While it may be true
that a corporation will avoid shareholder taxation if it uses its retained earnings and profits to embark upon a new business rather
than distributing the funds as dividends, it must be recognized that
the attitude expressed by the Regulations, the courts, and the Commissioner inhibits legitimate growth and is thus unrealistic and
unjustified. In 1959 the Regulations were ch<!-nged to the present
form, which states simply that "the business of a corporation is not
merely that which it has previously carried on but includes, in gen14. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.102-3(b) (1939).
15. The Commissioner has taken this position even recently. See Electric Regulator
Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964), reversing 40 T.C. 757 (1963). "If
the Treasury decides that the manufacture of 'Regohm' is the 'business,' then it would
forever consign petitioner to the manufacture of that product and view its need
accordingly." Id. at 345.
16. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir. 1958).
17. Ibid. See also Automotive Rebuilding Co., 27 P-H Tm,. Ct. Mem. 835 (1958). In
holding an accumulation unreasonable, the Tax Court confined the taxpayer's needs
to those of its "regular" business, although it suggested that an accumulation might
be reasonable if the taxpayer had already engaged in another business or "immediately
contemplated" so doing. However, in Jacob Sincoff, Inc. v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d
569 (2d Cir. 1953), the taxpayer was engaged in a securities business in addition to
being a jobber in the paper business; nevertheless, the court thought that since investment in securities was one way of avoiding a tax on shareholders, the taxpayer
could not argue that the needs of the securities business justified accumulating funds.
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eral, any line of business which it may undertake/'18 There is no
requirement in this Regulation that the new activity be related to
the former, and the courts have implied no, such limitation. Thus,
a corporation may change businesses, or it may take on more than
one business without being held automatically accountable under
section 531.19 Although courts seem to be somewhat more willing to
approve accumulations for a second business which is related to the
:first,2 o even accumulations for totally unrelated endeavors are sanctioned if the second business is actively <::arried on.21
The requirement that the· second business be "actively" carried
on is an important qualification, however. Wh~le an individual may
generally engage in any business or make any investment, corporate
diversification is more circumscribed because of the possibility of
tax avoidance. Legitimate corporate diversification under section 531
contemplates only active entry into new businesses or lines of
products.22 Passive investment in activities unrelated to the corporation's business, on the other hand, indicates that the funds so used
are not needed in the business, and that under the theory of section
531 they should be distributed as dividends to the shareholders, who
can then invest them, if they desire, to diversify their own holdings.
While recognizing that "inactive employment" of corporate earnings
ordinarily indicates an intent to assist stockholders in tax avoidance
and thus calls for scrutiny, courts do acknowledge that mere passiveness does not of itself make accumulation unreasonable if the invest- ,
ment can be classed as a liquid asset and if the taxpayer can show
that the accumulation was dictated by a business need requiring
the 'maintenance of a liquid position.23 For example, a temporary
18. Treas. Reg. § l.537-3(a) (1959).
19. Sandy Estate Co., 43 T.C. 361 (1964):
20. See, e.g., Havens & Martin v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9417 (E.D. Va.
1965); Buffalo Batt & Felt Corp. v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9724 (W.D.N.Y.
1964); Carolina Rubber Hose Co., P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1f 65229;
Alma Piston Co., 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1075 (1963); Youngs Rubber Corp., 31 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1766 (1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964).
21. See, e.g., Sandy Estate Co., 43 T.C. 361 (1964). The magnitude and character
of petitioner's mortgage loan activities were found sufficient to constitute a legitimate
"business" even though entirely unrelated to petitioner's apartment house business.
22. The requirement of "active" conduct of the new business is the clear import of
the Treasury's re-definition of the "business" of a corporation in 1959. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.537-3 (1959). See generally Altman, supra note 9; Altman, Corporate Accumulation of Earnings, 36 TAXES 933, 952 (1958). Where an entire business, is passive,
moreover, it is policed through the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code dealing
with personal holding companies, §§ 541-47. See generally Libin, Personal Holding
Companies and the Revenue Act of 1964, 63 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1965).
23. See, e.g., Oyster Shell Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1963);
R. Gsell & Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961), reversing 34 T.C. 41
(1960); Carolina Rubber Hose Co., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 11 65229.
Investments in real estate activities, however, are usually considered tainted. See,
e.g., Bardahl Mfg. Corp., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. D.EC. 1f 65200; J. Gordon
Turnbull, Inc., 41 T.C. 358 (1963).
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investment of funds was sanctioned where the necessity of paying
a future tax liability was shown and considered a reasonable need
of the business.24 Similarly, the purchase of another corporation's
stock which was readily convertible into cash was approved where
the purchase was made with money retained under a profit-sharing
plan and was intended as a partial funding of the corporation's
liability under the plan.25 Of course, if a permanent passive investment can itself be shown to be for the reasonable needs of the
business, there is no question of its propriety, as, for instance, in
situations involving the purchase of stock of a supplier to ensure
a reliable source of supply,26 loans to assist a company with which
the tax.payer does business,27 an investment in a bank with which
the tax.payer does business,28 or the purchase of government bonds
for use as collateral to obtain outside financing. 29 While passive investments may thus be approved for limited purposes, it is othenvise
clear that diversification of the corporate enterprise is proper only
through the active carrying on of the new trade or business.
II.

THE STANDARDS OF SECTION

531

While the difficulty of distinguishing carefully between the
business of a corporation and that of the shareholders, and also
between legitimate corporate diversification and mere diversion
of corporate funds, may be a cause contributing to the problems
of diversification within the framework of section 531, it is the
responsibility of Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
24. See Mead's Bakery, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEC, 11 64104, Sec also
Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d '79 (5th Cir. 1961); Bardahl Mfg, Corp.,
supra note 23.
25. See John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Bremerton Sun Publishing
Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965).
26. See Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., supra note 25.
2'7. See Metal Office Furniture Co., 21 P-H Tax Ct, Mem. 952 (1952) (loans made to
benefit the taxpayer through business relations). But see Raymond I. Smith, Inc, v.
Commissioner, 292 F.2d 4'70 (9th Cir. 1961), where an investment was found unrca•
sonable because of a gross disproportion between commitments made and prospective benefits to taxpayer. In Henry van Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX Cr, REP. &: MEM.
DEC. 11 64290, though the benefit to be derived from an investment was said to be
unclear, the investment was held to be reasonably related to taxpayer's business
since it had been motivated by business negotiations and was liquidated when the
negotiations were broken off.
Treas. Reg. § l.53'7-2(c) suggests three types of loans which may indicate unreasonable accumulation: loans to shareholders, loans unrelated to the conduct of the
business made to persons other than shareholders, and loans to corporations controlled by the shareholders of the taxpayer.
28. See Metal Office Furniture Co., supra note 27. But see Henry van Hummell, Inc.,
supra note 27, where it was held that since the taxpayer acquired only 2% of the
bank's stock and gained no representation on the board of directors, there was no
advantage to be derived from the investment.
29. See Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); Sandy Estate Co,, 48
T.C. 361 (1964).
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courts to accord recognition to corporate realities in designing and
applying standards to test the reasonableness of corporate accumulations. From time to time overtures have been made in this direction,
but the efforts have unfortunately fallen short of an adequate appraisal of the factors involved.
A. Congress and the Internal Revenue Service

When Congress was considering revision of the Internal Revenue
Code in 1954, complaints were received that the section 531 tax
was "prejudicial to small business," was "applied in an arbitrary
manner," and was "a constant threat to expanding business enterprises."30 The heart of the problem was the lack of adequate standards as to what constituted the reasonable needs of a business. Some
of the standards which had been used to test the reasonableness of
business needs were regarded by Congress as "erroneous or irrelevant."31 Indeed, it was noted that revenue agents often "applied
their individual concepts as to business needs. " 32 One test in particular which was thought to warrant specific correction was the
requirement that there must be an immediate need for the funds
in the business before a retention of earnings could be justified.33
To make it clear that a corporation committed to an expenditure of
funds should not be subject to the section 531 tax while it accumulated sufficient funds to carry out its plans, section 537 was added
to the Code, defining the reasonable needs of the business so as to
include the reasonably anticipated needs of the business. The thrust
of the congressional intent regarding application of this new section
was embodied in a revision of the Regulations in 1959. The Regulations now state that the reasonableness of an accumulation is to be
30. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1954). In an effort to remedy this situation, several new provisions were enacted. First, § 534 was added to shift the burden
of proof to the Commissioner in certain cases. It was felt that the prior procedure
of placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer in all' cases had had a number ·of
undesirable consequences, such as insufficient screening of cases before assertions of
deficiencies asserted, considerable expense and effort by taxpayers in proving accumulations reasonable, use of the tax as a threat to force settlement on other issues, and
submission to the tax by taxpayers to avoid the expense of litigation. See id. at 70.
For a discussion of how § 534 has failed to live up to the hopes for it, see generally
Pye, Section 534 and the Shiftless Burden of Proof, 51 A.B.A.J. 784 (1965). Second, an
accumulated earnings credit was provided for in § 535(c). See note 8 supra. The
$60,000 (now $100,000) minimum credit was specifically designed to give small corporations an opportunity to accumulate for expansion without fear of the § 531 tax. The
credit for so much of an accumulation as is shown to be for the reasonable needs of
the business was included to avoid the harsh situation where most of an accumulation
could be justified, but a small portion could not be.
31. For example, it had been the rule that a corporation which distributed 70%
of its earnings would not be subjected to the tax. See Treas. Dep't Release, April
~~

.

32. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954).
33. See, e.g., Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
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determined, in general, by a "prudent businessman" test.84 However,
in allowing a corporation to justify an accumulation of earnings
and profits on the basis of reasonably anticipated future needs, the
Treasury Department adopted in the Regulations the congressional
committees' language, which requires that further standards be met.
Thus, "there must be an indication that the future needs of the
business require such accumulation, . . . the corporatio~ must
have specific, definite, and feasible plans for the use of such accumulation,''35 and, finally, execution of such plans must not be "postponed
indefinite!y. " 36
B. The Courts
While three elements-necessity, plans, and execution-are thus
required to justify an accumulation for the reasonably anticipated
future needs of a business, most section 531 cases have centered on
the second of these elements, the corporate plans for the use of an
accumulation. It has not been difficult for corporations to formulate
some general "need," such as expansion, enlargement of working
capital, or diversification, 37 and "execution" has rarely been a critical
consideration. When the plans have been found insufficient, the ,
question of execution has of course not been reached; 38 when the
plans have been found sufficient, they have in fact usually been
implemented.89 In focusing their attention upon the second element,
the plans for the use of the accumulated funds, the courts have
placed great reliance on the _standard of specificity, definiteness, and
feasibility of the plans.40 Several recent cases, however, indicate a
certain degree of judicial disenchantment with the standards for
evaluating the sufficiency of the plans.41 The courts in these cases
have felt constrained to talk in terms of the congressional language
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-l(a) (1959).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-l(b)(l) (1959).
36. Ibid.
37. See, e.g., Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1956); Robert R.
Walker, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. &: MEM. DEc. 11 65028. In J. Gordon Turnbull,
Inc., 41 T.C. 358 (1963), however, taxpayer's investments in unrelated activities were
thought to indicate that there was no need for the funds in the business,
. 38. ~ee, e.g., Carlen Realty Co. v. Tomlinson, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas, 11 9425 (5th Cir.
1965); Robert R. Walker, Inc., supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., Alma Piston Co., 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1075 (1963).
40. See, e.g., Henry van Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX Cr. REP.&: MEM. DEc, 1164290,
at 1954-64: "The cases have held repeatedly, and the ••• Regulation requires, that
the corporation .•• must have definite and specific plans for this use." See also Dar•
row Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1961); I. A. Dress Co, v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960); Robert R. Walker, Inc.,
P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP.&: MEM. DEC. 11 65028.
41. Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964), reversing
40 T.C. 757 (1963); Oman Constr. Co., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. &: MEr,t. DEC, 11 65325;
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 11 65248; Carolina
Rubber Ho~e Co., P·H 1965 TAX ~T. REP. &: MEM. DEc. 11 65229; Alma Piston Co,,
32 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 1075 (1963).
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and the language of the Regulations, but they have qualified that
language in such a way as to indicate a recognition that the standard
of specificity holds no magic in itself. Rather, it is merely a frequently
convenient measure of the likelihood that a corporation will follow
through with an avowed goal. As the courts which have been troubled
by the specificity standard recognize, there are other instances where
specificity of plans is not a realistic standard by which to test corporate accumulations. It is suggested that this is especially true when
the "business need" identified is diversification. As noted previously,
opportunities for diversification are not always readily available,
and a corporation legitimately planning to undertake diversification
out of internally generated funds may often be required to accumulate funds for an indefinite period without specific plans for their
use. While the courts must not permit violations of section 531,
neither must they ignore these realities of corporate life.

III. A NEW .APPROACH
The approach of the courts in recent cases has been that if a
corporation is able to demonstrate, by reference to factors other
than specificity of plans, a sufficient likelihood that it will follow
through with its expressed intentions for use of accumulated funds,
the mere absence of specificity of plans should not warrant section
531 liability. The analysis required by this approach involves a
more extended inquiry into the facts of each case than a mere search
for specific plans. In addition, if this approach is indicative of a ·
trend, section 531 cases will depend more than ever upon the facts
of each case. It is possible, nevertheless, to categorize certain situations and to identify certain factors which would indicate when
and to what extent the rigidity of the specificity requirement might
be relaxed.
A. Involuntary Diversification
When diversification is involuntary-that is, when there are
hazards facing a business which would indicate to a prudent businessman the need for diversification-the likelihood of a planned
diversification becoming a reality is increased sufficiently to allow
a concomitant decrease in the reliance on the specificity of the plans,
so long as there is some additional evidence that the taxpayer intends
to meet the hazards. Of course, funds may not legitimately be
accumulated for unrealistic hazards/2 for "vague and unsupported
premonitions of the future,'' 43 or for "unexpected demands" or
42. Treas. Reg. § l.537•2(c)(5) (1959).
43. Youngs Rubber Corp., 31 P·H Tax Ct. Mero. 1766 (1962), afj'd, 331 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1964). Compare KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951),
and Southland Indus., Inc., 15 P·H Tax Ct. Mem. 897 (1946), with Havens & Martin
v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1[ 9417 (E.D. Va. 1965).
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"unanticipated emergencies."44 When the hazards are real, however,
the remedial measures undertaken by the taxpayer are likely to be
just as real. Furthermore, that the hazard is only a contingency
should be immaterial, because regardless of the occurrence of the
contingent event, the important points are whether the taxpayer
reasonably believes that it will be forced to enter a new business
and whether it intends to enter the new business when and if the
imminence of the threat should demand such action. 40 Thus, it has
been persuasively argued that "a corporation which sees a financial
storm on the horizon should be able to accumulate earnings merely
to weather the storm, to provide a cushion against a foreseeable
drain on earnings and/or capital without having to use the funds
for diversification~a diversification which might not be needed when
the financial storm has passed."46 Although it did not arise in the
diversification setting, the recent case of Oman Constr. Co.47 is illustrative of this principle. Taxpayer, a heavy construction company,
retained earnings in order to protect against the risks of loss which
were particularly acute in its foreign construction projects because
of transportation hazards, political upheaval, native labor problems,
currency exchange limitations, health risks, and communications
difficulties. In addition, in taxpayer's business it bid on many jobs
but did not know in advance which bids would be successful. Once
a bid was accepted, however, taxpayer was committed to complete
the job, with the constant possibility of having to buy more equipment. While it has frequently been held in the past that a corporation may reasonably protect against contingencies,48 here the Commissioner argued that taxpayer must have specific plans for use of
its accumulated funds in order to justify their retention. Although
taxpayer had no specific plans for the use of its accumulated funds
for each purpose identified, further analysis' showed sufficient possibility of use of the funds for equipment, qualification to bid, losses,
renegotiation refunds, and maintaining an organization of engineers
and superintendents, that the Tax Court found that the accumula44. Smoot Sand &: Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 922, rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1957).
45. Smoot Sand &: Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 44. The court of
appeals reversed the Tax Court, which had said that the taxpayer never planned to
enter the new business voluntarily and that the contingency which might have forced
it to do so never developed. 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 330 (1956). See also Havens &:
Martin v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 'J 9417 (E.D. Va. 1965).
46. Henry van Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX Or. REP. &: MEM, DEC, 'J 64290, at
1954-64 (dictum); cf. Ted Bates &: Co., P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. &: MEM. DEC, 'J 65251.
47. P-H 1965 TAX Or. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 'J 65325.
48. See, e.g., Smoot Sand &: Gravel Corp v. Commissioner, 241 F,2d 197 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922, rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1957). But see Henry van
Hummell, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 'J 64290 (plans for contingency
must be specific).
•

April 1966]

Accumulated Earnings Tax

1145

tion for the "collective" purposes could not be said to be unreasonable.
When the hazards are both realized and permanent rather than
merely contingent, the effort to diversify will ordinarily be more
intensive, but the problem of specificity of plans is the same. One
of the most persuasive evidences that a "permanent hazard" is
confronting a corporation is a decline in business. While some
business declines might be reversed by cutting costs or increasing
sales promotion, often the only way to remedy the decline is to
diversify into a new business or line of products. An examination
of the reasons for a decline in business is thus necessary in order
to determine the probability of diversification taking place because
of the decline. The strongest case is a complete cutting off of the
taxpayer's business, as, for instance, through loss of a franchise.
Here, a corporation's only alternative to dissolution is to enter a
new business. Therefore, unless such a taxpayer is making no bona
fide effort to find a suitable new business, the absence of specific
plans should not warrant a section 531 penalty.49 Almost as convincing a situation is one involving a technological change which
causes the taxpayer's product to become obsolescent. The extent of
both the innovation and the resultant obsolescence must be examined, but where they indicate continued decline or eventual termination of the taxpayer's business, the situation is the same as
above. 50 In Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 51 for example,
taxpayer argued that technological change in its industry necessitated
49. In Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1956), the taxpayer corporation had operated a Chevrolet dealership which was cancelled on October 31, 1948,
leaving the taxpayer with $750,000 in idle funds. When the corporation was liquidated
in 1953 upon the death of the sole shareholder, however, it still had not undertaken
any new business. This delay is of itself, of course, some evidence of an intent to avoid
tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-I(b)(2) (1959). In addition, there was little evidence that
any real effort had been made to find a new business, except an expression of concern
in the minutes of the corporation and a change in the corporate charter to permit the
carrying on of a real estate business. While diversification opportunities may not be
readily available, certainly it must be recognized that there comes a point at which
failure to put idle funds to work must be penalized.
50. In Buffalo Batt & Felt Corp. v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9724
(W.D.N.Y. 1964), an accumulation was held reasonable where, because of the development of substitutes for cotton batting in the furniture industry, and because the
furniture and textile industries were moving to the South and thus impairing taxpayer's
ability to compete, taxpayer expected severe declines in its business. Taxpayer was
"contemplating" production of a synthetic fiber fill and was "considering" acquisition
of a furniture company.
In Youngs Rubber Corp., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 1766 (1962), a/fd, 331 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1964), taxpayer, a manufacturer of rubber prophylactics, had already diversified
into other lines of similar products to meet the competitive threat of oral contraceptives. An accumulation of $500,000 labeled simply for "technological progress,'' was
thus thought by the court to be unreasonable.
51. 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964), reversing 40 T.C. 757 (1963).
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the retention of funds to develop new products. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's finding of
unreasonable accumulation, noting that in this day of rapid technological change products may quickly become outmoded and it is
not always possible for a corporation to have a specific goal at the
time funds are set aside. "Comments made in the past to the effect
that a definite plan actually followed through must be on the company's books and records before moneys assigned thereto become
anticipated needs may have to be appropriately qualified in particular
cases." 62 The court noted that taxpayer, a manufacturer of electric
regulating devices, was in a field where technological change was a
particularly relevant consideration. Indeed, demand for taxpayer's
primary product had recently fallen off to the extent that it had
been forced to develop a number of new products, necessitating
greater space and equipment. The possibility of a recurrence of such
a decline required that taxpayer be allowed t_o accumulate funds to
develop new products. Also illustrative of the extent to which technological change will spur diversification is 4-lma Piston Go.,tm in
which taxpayer, a supplier of automotive clutches, suffered a business
decline when automatic transmissions were introduced on a large
scale. During a four-year period, taxpayer accumulated funds with
which it hoped to acquire a new business. The Commissioner assessed a section 531 penalty tax, arguing that taxpayer had no specific
plans during the accumulation period, but the Tax Court, noting that
a new business had eventually been acquired after lengthy negotiations, stated that "in our view such plans were specific and definite
and were clearly feasible as is established by their consummation ...." 64 Certainly it can be questioned whether taxpayer's plans
were indeed "specific" during all of the years in issue; nevertheless,
there would appear, by reason of the nature of taxpayer's business
decline and its intensive search for a new business, to have been
sufficient likelihood of diversification that the accumulation was
properly held reasonable.
Finally, instances may occur where the taxpayer's buyers suffer
a decline in business which is then reflected in taxpayer's business.
The persuasiveness of this reason for accumulation of funds with a
view to diversification depends in turn upon the reason for the
buyers' decline, but to the extent that the decline is caused by factors
which render the taxpayer's position incapable of improvement by
means other than diversification; once again diversification is probable even apart from specific plans. For example, in Carolina Rubber
52. Id. at 346.
53. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1075 (1963).
54. Id. at 1094.
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Hose Co./' 5 taxpayer was engaged in the railroad hose business, but
planned to convert to the rubber roll business because of the decline
of railroads. Once again the Commissioner asserted that the plans
were not sufficiently specific. The court, although apparently convinced that taxpayer would eventually consummate its plans, was
very much concen:ied with the specificity requirement of the Regulations. The court finally concluded, however, that the plans were
not "so uncertain or vague as to be disqualified." 56 Here again the
strict specificity of the plans could probably be drawn into question,
but the indicia of the necessity for modernization and diversification
were sufficient to indicate the likelihood that taxpayer would accomplish its avowed intention. The court acknowledged that further
developments might prove its judgment wrong, but stated that subsequent years must be judged in light of the facts as they then exist. 57
The mere fact that a business is faced with hazards cannot of
course be said to indicate conclusively that an accumulation--of funds
is for the reasonable needs of the business. However, to the extent
that the pressures caused by the hazards indicate that the business
must undertake diversification to rectify the situation, and to the
extent that the taxpayer indicates that it is embarking on those
steps as an alternative to stagnation or dissolution of the business,
it seems reasonable that the emphasis placed upon the requirement
of specific plans for use of an accumulation should be decreased.
B. Voluntary Diversification
It is clear that a corporation may, of its own free will, accumulate
funds in order to diversify its operations. When the diversification
is purely voluntary, however, the standards for testing the accumulation must be strict. In such cases, requiring specificity of plans may
be the best way to ensure that a corporation will follow through with
the diversification and not merely accumulate funds, avoid taxation,
and yet continue to claim that it intends to diversify. Even here,
however, there may be instances when specific plans should not be
required. This was the case in Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 58 where
taxpayer, which accumulated funds to acquire other newspaper publishing companies, successfully overcame the Commissioner's charge
of lack of specific plans by showing that its need for expansion and
55. P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1f 65229.
56. Id. at 1281-65. But see Robert R. Walker, Inc., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. 8: MEM.
DEc. ,r 65028. In Walker, taxpayer transported Studebaker automobiles, but in 1957

was investigating new "lines of business because Studebaker's business was declining.
The Tax Court held, however, that since in 1957 the taxpayer had no specific plans
for the use of its accumulated earnings, those earnings were unreasonable.
'57. P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1f 65229, at 1282-65.
58. P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. 8: MEM. DEC. 1f 65248.
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acquisition of other newspapers was reasonable, in view of a trend
in the newspaper business toward consolidation and large chain
operations, a desire for greater dissemination of its political views,
the need to give promising young executives greater responsibility
and financial opportunity, and, finally, taxpayer's history of acquisitions. The Tax Court, in holding the accumulation reasonable,
analyzed the sp~cificity requirement in the context of the particular
business involved, and concluded that where opportunities for expansion and acquisition are not readily available, plans need not
be as definite as might othenvise be required to support a finding of
reasonableness. The court recognized the unique nature of the newspaper industry and decided that since newspapers were not fungible
commodities, it was not possible for the taxpayer to acquire another
newspaper immediately upon a decision to do so. The most a taxpayer in such a situation may be able to do, it was concluded, is to
demonstrate "a concurrent course of action . . . directed toward
the averred purpose of accumulation," 50 or, in other words, "actively
[to] search out opportunities for acquisitions." 60 Thus, even in the
voluntary diversification situation it may be possible for a corporation to set forth sufficient indicia that the likelihood of diversification occurring can reasonably be said to outweigh the possibility of
a section 531 violation.61
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has been presented on the basis of reported cases. It may be that, in the many instances which never reach
the courts, the attitude of examining agents and regional settlement
officers toward the above problems is actually more reasonable than
that reflected by the Commissioner's litigation policy. Nevertheless,
litigated cases, with the exception of those referred to above, indicate
a strict policy on the part of the Service and the courts. Since it is
_important that taxpayers not be deterred from valid diversification
and economic growth, it is suggested that steps be taken to reassure
taxpayers that their good faith efforts will not be thwarted by what
appear to be the unduly restrictive standards now used to determine
the permissibility under section 531 of accumulation of funds. Perhaps what the courts have been doing in the recent cases previously
discussed is simply applying the Regulations' general test of the
59. Id. at 1465-65.
60. Ibid.
61. See also Mead's Bakery, Inc., P-H 1964 TAX CT. Rl!.P. &: MEM. DEC. 1J 64104,
where taxpayer, in order to obtain a loan, was required to agree not to enter any
new line of business. The court held reasonable an accumulation of funds with a
view to entering the potato chip and frozen baked goods businesses, which taxpayer
had entered indirectly through its shareholders with the understanding that it would
acquire the businesses directly when the loan restrictions were lifted.
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"prudent businessman." If so, it would seem advisable to eliminate
the specificity requirement from the regulatory criteria, and to make
specificity merely a factor to be employed where useful. In addition,
to give some guidance to taxpayers and revenue agents, revenue
rulings and examples in the Regulations should be published to
show the types of situations in which a mere absence of specific
plans should not warrant the imposition of the accumulated earnings
penalty tax.
James C. Westin

